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Collaborative Privacy - A Community-based
Privacy Infrastructure
Jan Kolter, Thomas Kernchen and Gu¨nther Pernul
Abstract The landscape of the World Wide Web with all its versatile services heav-
ily relies on the disclosure of private user information. Service providers collect-
ing more and more of these personal user data pose a growing privacy threat for
users. Addressing user concerns privacy-enhancing technologies emerged. One goal
of these technologies is to enable users to improve the control over their personal
data. A famous representative is the PRIME project that aims for a holistic privacy-
enhancing identity management system. However, approaches like the PRIME pri-
vacy architecture require service providers to change their server infrastructure and
add specific privacy-enhancing components. In the near future, service providers are
not expected to alter internal processes. In this paper, we introduce a collaborative
privacy community that allows the open exchange of privacy-related information.
We lay out the privacy community’s functions and potentials within a user-centric,
provider-independent privacy architecture that will help foster the usage and accep-
tance of privacy-enhancing technologies.
1 Introduction
Today’s rich offer of services on the World Wide Web increasingly requires the
release of personal user data, which poses a growing privacy threat to Internet users.
Web site providers use these personal data to create and analyze profiles or to trigger
personalized advertisements. At the worst, personal information is released or sold
to third parties.
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Motivated by users who needed technical means to protect their private data,
privacy-enhancing technologies emerged [6, 14]. A frequently discussed subject in
this area is anonymity on network level. On application level, privacy-enhancing
technologies aim for solutions that assist users in controlling and managing the
disclosure of personal data. However, most approaches rely on the compliance of
service providers who are required to reveal their data handling practices truthfully.
The goal of this paper is the introduction of a collaborative privacy community
that facilitates a service-provider-independent privacy management. We propose a
user-centric privacy architecture and show the functions and the potentials of an
inherent collaborative privacy community. Finally, we present a prototypical imple-
mentation of our solution.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After describing related
work in Section 2, we present an overview as well as the components of a user-
centric privacy architecture in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce the content,
functions and the implementation of our collaborative privacy community. Section
5 concludes the paper with an outlook on future work.
2 Related Work
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [7] represents an early privacy-enhan-
cing technology system. Offering a suitable policy language that allows service
providers to express machine-readable privacy policies, P3P enables a privacy agent
on user-side to indicate deviations from previously-specified privacy preferences.
Weaknesses of P3P have been subject to frequent discussions in the past [10, 15].
As P3P assumes complete and truthful privacy policies, most service providers’ hes-
itation to offer P3P privacy policies is a main reason for P3P’s lagging acceptance.
Aiming to support users’ ability to maintain their privacy, the European PRIME
project1 (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe) developed a privacy-en-
hancing identity management system, containing a privacy architecture with differ-
ent design guidelines, protocols and prototypical scenarios [18].
The PRIME architecture (see Fig. 1) allows users to control the disclosure and the
usage of their personal data [18, 25]. A significant element of the architecture is the
PRIME Toolbox, which needs to be installed both on client-side and on user-side.
The PRIME Toolbox incorporates all necessary components for privacy-enhancing
identity management and enables users to manage and use different digital identities
with varying personal data.
A further element of the PRIME architecture is the PRIME Middleware that inte-
grates all PRIME components and coordinates the communication between PRIME
interaction parties. The PRIME console serves as a graphical interface enabling
users to set privacy-related preferences that are used to negotiate data handling prac-
tices with service providers. Furthermore, an overview of already disclosed data is
1 https://www.prime-project.eu/
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Fig. 1 High Level PRIME Architecture [18]
provided. The architecture is capable of enforcing negotiated policies, utilizing the
installed PRIME components of service providers.
In order to make use of the described PRIME functionality, both users and ser-
vice providers need to install the PRIME Middleware and the PRIME Toolbox.
From a user perspective the attractiveness of PRIME rises, if the majority of service
providers adapt their service infrastructure. Hence, the success of PRIME highly
relies on the service providers’ willingness to integrate the described PRIME com-
ponents into their applications.
3 User-centric Privacy Architecture
In the last section we described existing privacy solutions that strongly rely on the
compliance of service providers. From today’s perspective it seems unlikely that
service providers will fundamentally change their proven back-end services. Ris-
ing privacy threats of users will not convince service providers to adopt a com-
prehensive and complex privacy infrastructure. Furthermore, conflicting with their
own interests, Web site providers will not contribute to the accuracy and quality of
machine-readable privacy policies voluntarily.
Addressing these facts, we introduce a user-centric, provider-independent pri-
vacy architecture, employing a collaborative privacy community to share and ex-
change privacy-related information among Internet users. Unlike provider-depen-
dent solutions our proposed architecture does not require service providers to set
up additional components or functions. Accepting today’s service landscape of the
World Wide Web, we enable Internet users to control the disclosure and manage-
ment of personal data.
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Fig. 2 Collaborative, Provider-independent Privacy Architecture
In Fig. 2 we present an overview of our privacy architecture. Seeking means to
make an informed decision about the disclosure of personal data, the user is sup-
ported by a browser plug-in, which serves as the user interface. The browser plug-in
displays privacy-related information and functions, which are provided by three lo-
cal privacy components. The Privacy Preference Generator component assists users
in controlling future information flows of personal data. The Privacy Agent compo-
nent helps users check and control actual information flows. Finally, the Data Dis-
closure Log provides an overview of past personal information flows. All local pri-
vacy components interact with a collaborative privacy community, which provides
supplemental privacy-relevant information about service providers. The community
is maintained cooperatively by all participating members.
In the following we shortly discuss the main functions of each local privacy com-
ponent, before the collaborative privacy community is introduced in Section 4.
3.1 Local Privacy Components
Potential information flows reflect a system’s potential to disclose information [17].
From a privacy perspective, modeling users’ privacy preferences, which define fu-
ture disclosures of personal data, is a critical challenge.
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Our user-centric privacy architecture provides a user-friendly Privacy Preference
Generator component. The resulting privacy preferences reflect users’ willingness to
release personal data under certain circumstances and serve as basis for underlying
privacy tools. APPEL [9], a privacy preference language built for P3P, provides a
language to represent rule-based privacy preferences.
In our architecture, we allow users to define privacy preferences individually for
different Internet service types [4], guaranteeing more realistic and practical privacy
preferences.
Privacy tools that protect actual information flows help users make an informed
disclosure decision, when personal data is about to be released to a service provider.
The presented privacy architecture employs a Privacy Agent component that su-
pervises data transactions. If available, the agent reads the privacy policy of a service
provider and matches it with pre-defined privacy preferences. Doing so, the agent
recommends a certain behavior to the user. The P3P specification [7] provides the
necessary technical means for the representation of privacy policies. The XACML
standard [21] allows a more fine-grained and flexible definition of policies [2]. An
example for a P3P-compliant privacy agent is the Privacy Bird [8], a browser plug-in
for the Microsoft Internet Explorer.
Finally, our privacy architecture provides a tool that keeps track of all personal
data transactions. Such a disclosure log allows users to manage personal data once
they have been transferred to a service provider [22, 23]. A data transaction log
bears the potential to present users a clear overview, which service provider stores
what personal data at a certain time. This component requires both tracking func-
tions that record and store data disclosures as well as usable interfaces that illustrate
data transactions in an understandable way. Ideally, the disclosure log allows users
to directly access, change or remove disclosed personal data stored by a service
provider. Furthermore, a data disclosure log is capable of calculating potential link-
abilities between data transactions.
4 Collaborative Privacy Community
Representing the central element of our presented privacy architecture, the collab-
orative privacy community facilitates the exchange of privacy-relevant information,
ratings and experiences about service providers. These experiences involve, how
personal data are used by certain service providers, and whether that usage is con-
sistent with service providers’ published privacy policies. These data represent a
valuable, provider-independent information source for all three local privacy com-
ponents, leading to a more informed disclosure behavior and enhanced privacy man-
agement of users.
The privacy community provides two access points. Internet users can browse a
Wiki-like [19] Web front-end. Information about each service provider is grouped
into articles, which can be viewed and edited by users. In addition, the privacy
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community provides a Web service interface, allowing local privacy components
on user-side to directly access necessary information.
4.1 Content and Functions
Underscoring the advantages of a provider-independent privacy infrastructure, we
present the following structural and functional characteristics of our introduced pri-
vacy community.
For each service provider the community stores and offers static information, the
required amount of personal data for each offered process, third parties the service
provider shares personal data with, a description and evaluation of current and past
privacy policies, the adherence to the published privacy policies, as well as indi-
vidual experiences and ratings of community users. Additionally, the privacy com-
munity facilitates the controlled exchange of privacy preferences among connected
users.
4.1.1 Static Information about Service Providers
When accessing an unknown Web site without privacy-enhancing technologies,
users generally have the option to trust a service provider’s privacy statement at face
value or to find information about the service provider’s reputation. A survey [12]
shows that many users do not look up reputational information, but rather judge
service providers’ trustworthiness by estimating the Web site’s ”Look and Feel”,
considering questionable factors.
As collecting information about a service provider is time-consuming, this be-
havior of especially inexperienced users is understandable. Addressing this fact, the
privacy community gives users an overview of information about service providers,
such as the server location, the service type and a short description of the service
offer. That information is utilized by the local Privacy Agent component and dis-
played to the user on demand, enabling users to easily retrieve necessary data to
judge the trustworthiness of service providers. The provider’s service type enables
the Privacy Agent to more accurately match privacy preferences of the user with a
Web site’s privacy policy. The local Data Disclosure Log component benefits from
information, how to access and revoke personal information that have already been
transferred to a service provider.
In particular, static information about a service provider in our privacy commu-
nity include:
• the service provider’s URL
• the location of the server
• the offered service type(s)
• information how to change/revoke already transferred personal data
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• contact information
• a short textual description of the service provider
• overall privacy rating
A URL is required to exactly identify each service provider. The server location
clarifies jurisdictional matters, as different privacy laws apply in different coun-
tries. The offered service type(s) allow the application of more fine-tuned privacy
preferences. As each service provider’s service type (e.g. ”Web Mail” or ”Online
Shopping”) is accessible, privacy preferences can individually be defined and ap-
plied for each service type. Helping users exercise their rights to access and control
already transferred data [11], the community provides information (e.g. a link or an
e-mail address) how to change or remove these disclosed information. Exact contact
information facilitates prosecution, if personal data are misused, or if users want to
enforce their rights to revoke their personal data. Furthermore, a short description
specifies the main characteristics of a service provider. Finally, an aggregated overall
privacy rating shows a quick estimate of user ratings, which are explained below.
4.1.2 Required Amount of Personal Data
Our proposed privacy community enables users to know in advance, what personal
information is needed to use a certain service in the World Wide Web.
Users generally understand the necessity to disclose, for example, their name,
address and payment information for a product order at an online shop. If the ser-
vice provider asks for additional information, such as the marital status, the date-of-
birth or the annual salary, users tend to abort the process, if they feel uncomfortable
releasing this excessive data. An online survey we conducted with 350 persons re-
vealed that 77% of all test persons cancel registration and buying processes, if too
many personal data are requested. Unfortunately, with today’s technical means users
are unable to determine at most Web sites, what personal information is necessary
to use a specific service. To find out, users have to start the process of filling Web
forms. In many cases the most privacy-sensitive information is requested on the last
form page. If the user decides not to proceed, the frustrated user wasted valuable
time and disclosed the already transferred information with no use.
The privacy community spares users from this negative experience and offers
the amount of necessary data in advance. For each process a service provider offers
the community stores all required personal data. In this context, a process refers
to each separate action the service provider offers, such as ”Buy” or ”Subscribe
to Newsletter”. In addition, the community stores, when a process relies on the
completion of a different process. The process ”Buy” could, for instance, require
the completion of the process ”Registration”. An automatic evaluation based on the
service type assists users in evaluating the required amount of personal data a service
provider requests.
As the amount of collected personal data represents a fundamental element of pri-
vacy policies, the local Privacy Agent can retrieve this information from the com-
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munity and match it with individual privacy preferences, if no machine-readable
privacy policy is available from the service provider.
4.1.3 Third Party Releases
The decision to disclose personal information to a service provider not only relies on
the amount of data, but also on the service provider’s data handling practices. Here,
the release of user data to third parties is a considerably privacy-sensitive factor.
For each service provider the privacy community stores third parties the service
provider shares personal data with. These parties could be affiliated companies or
corporate networks. This information can be displayed to the user by the local Pri-
vacy Agent on demand. Again, information about third party releases can be utilized
to replace a machine-readable privacy policy of the service provider.
4.1.4 Collecting and Explaining Privacy Policies
For many users the service provider’s textual privacy policy is the only available
information about data handling practices. Studies show, however, that privacy poli-
cies are not understandable to and are read by only a small fraction of Internet users
[16, 24]. A privacy community facilitates experienced users to write an understand-
able description of privacy policies. As privacy experts comprehend all aspects of a
policy, they have the ability to paraphrase important elements of the privacy policy
in a form that - compared to automatic privacy policy summaries [3, 8] - is easy to
understand.
Furthermore, as privacy policies change over time, the community keeps a his-
tory of privacy policies, containing both textual policies as well as machine-readable
P3P policies, if available. This enables users to compare ex post, what privacy policy
has been valid, when personal data have been disclosed to a service provider.
The privacy community also allows users to rate each stored privacy policy. A
calculated privacy rank [1] supports inexperienced users to recognize and compare
data handling practices of service providers.
4.1.5 Adherence to Privacy Policies
As a privacy-friendly privacy policy is no guarantee that a service provider will
follow this expressed policy, our community enables users to rate the policy adher-
ence of service providers. Based on their individual experiences users can evalu-
ate, whether a service provider processes personal data as stated in a privacy pol-
icy. For example, if not expressed in the privacy policy, a personalized e-mail of-
fering a product would justify a negative policy adherence rating of this service
provider. Displayed by the local Privacy Agent, this information considerably influ-
ences users’ decision to disclose personal data.
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4.1.6 Sharing Privacy Preferences with Connected Users
In Section 3.1 we pointed out the purpose and usage of individual privacy prefer-
ences. The Privacy Preference Generator component allows the definition of these
disclosure rules, which are in turn used by the Privacy Agent component to calcu-
late disclosure recommendations. The quality of these recommendations strongly
relies on the accuracy of the defined privacy preferences. Even though the Privacy
Preference Generator component should alleviate this challenge by offering a usable
and understandable user interface, building accurate privacy preferences is a critical
task. This especially applies to inexperienced users, as they are not familiar with
service providers’ data handling practices and the privacy-related language used.
For these users the privacy community offers means to adopt privacy preferences
from experienced users. Offering a social networking component [5], the privacy
community allows users to upload and share privacy preferences with connected
users. Privacy preferences of a trusted privacy expert represent valuable input for
the local Privacy Agent of inexperienced users, resulting in improved disclosure
recommendations.
4.2 User Management
The privacy community manages three different user roles. The basic user role is as-
signed to every user and allows the access of all information about service providers.
Furthermore, it permits editing articles collaboratively. Basic users are able to create
articles of new service providers. In order to prevent vandalism, the privacy commu-
nity provides backup and archive functionality. An overview of all existing articles
is available.
If users want to connect to other members of the privacy community, a simple
registration is necessary. Registration only requires a username and a password.
The community does not request any additional personal information. Registered
users have the opportunity to upload their privacy preferences. Offering a social
networking component, it is possible to look up and connect to friends who can
share privacy preferences. We point out that this social networking component does
not have the purpose of maintaining social contacts but only to exchange privacy
experiences and privacy preferences. Users can self-assess their level of knowledge
and experience in the area of privacy, helping inexperienced users to estimate the
quality of their opinions and preferences.
Finally, users holding the administrator role define vocabularies of service pro-
viders’ offered processes as well as personal data types. If necessary, administrators
are able to block users/members.
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4.3 Prototype
We implemented a prototype of our proposed privacy community. The Web front-
end is available following this link2.
4.3.1 Architecture
Figure 3 depicts the privacy community’s architecture. As both the community’s
Web front-end and the local privacy components on user-side, access the commu-
nity, we employ a service-oriented architecture (SOA) [20]. A SOA loosely couples
client applications from the back-end and provides a high degree of interoperability.
This enables a variety of clients to access the community database. Web services that
provide a machine-readable WSDL definition encapsulate all information pieces of
the community. Furthermore, the interaction via SOAP messages guarantees a con-
sistent data exchange format.
For the Web front-end we utilize an Ajax-based [13] Web architecture, allow-
ing asynchronous, interactive communication between the Web front-end and the
community server. The client-side Ajax engine transforms JavaScript requests into
SOAP requests, which are sent to the community server. The Web service server
receives and processes requests querying the community database, before requested
data are sent back to the client via SOAP. On client-side the Ajax engine transforms
the SOAP messages to a user-friendly GUI, employing html and css. The local pri-
vacy components of our presented architecture - the Privacy Preference Generator
(PPG), the Privacy Agent (PA) and the Data Disclosure Log (DDL) - directly access
the Web service server via SOAP messages.
Fig. 3 Architecture of the Privacy Community
2 http://www-ifs.uni-regensburg.de/Privacy/Community
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4.3.2 Implementation
For the Web front end we utilize the JavaScript framework Yahoo! UI Library3
(YUI), which offers the necessary drag & drop and autocomplete functions as well
as overlays and browser history handling.
The back-end employs NuSOAP4, a PHP-based Web service server that provides
the required functionality for our proposed solution. The Web service interface def-
initions can be accessed following this link5.
For the sake of brevity the interested reader is referred to the hyperlink above for
a detailed review of the front-end design.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we present the concept and design of a collaborative privacy commu-
nity. Marking a central element of our underlying user-centric privacy architecture,
the privacy community allows a provider-independent exchange of privacy-relevant
information and ratings about service providers. Moreover, our solution enables
users to know in advance, what personal data is required for a specific service. Ben-
efitting from the knowledge of experienced users, the privacy community facilitates
a more informed decision about the disclosure and management of personal data.
Provider independence as well as the collaborative character will contribute to a
broader acceptance of privacy-enhancing technologies.
Future work will involve user tests as well as the integration of local privacy
components.
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